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MULTIPLE LITIGANTS WITH A PUBLIC

GOOD REMEDY

Robert C. Marshall, Michael J. Meurer, and
Jean-Francois Richard

ABSTRACT
Potential bidders are frequently excluded from participation in a federal
procurement by the mandatory specifications or evaluation criteria in the bid
solicitation. For certain procurements aggrieved bidders can protest
inappropriateexclusions to a quasi-judicialboard. We present a model where

there aremultiplepotentiallitigants and the remedy is a public good. Equilibrium
litigation can arise without decision errors by the court or information
asymmetries. We show that protests can deter inappropriateexclusions but can
also lead to undesirable settlement agreements. The free-riderproblem created

by the public good remedy can also cause voluntary revisions of an excessively
restrictive bid solicitation as an equilibrium phenomenon. In our normative

analysiswe show that a ban of cashsettlements can worsen thefree-riderproblem
and thereby lead to diminished deterrence.
Most of the monitoring to assure compliance with federal procurement
regulations is done by the Department of Justice, various inspectors general,
Research in Law and Economics, Volume 16, pages 151-173.
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the GAO, or the Congress. However, oversight of the procurement process
is not entirely in the hands of central authorities. In the case of computers
and telecommunications equipment, much of procurement law is enforced at
the initiative of individual vendors who compete against one another for federal
contracts. Vendors who are aggrieved at any stage of a procurement can protest
the discretionary actions of the procuring agency. A common grievance is that
the bid solicitation is unjustly restrictive resulting in the effective elimination
of a subset of potential bidders from the procurement.' Beyond blatantly
corrupt behavior involving direct personal enrichment, inappropriate
exclusions might be attributed to the existence of less obvious principal-agent
problems. In this work, we assume that taxpayers (the principal) are interested
in maximizing the expected surplus from a procurement but a procurement
official (the agent, PO), whose behavior is difficult for taxpayers to directly
monitor, potentially has a different objective. 2
Disgruntled vendors may file a protest at the General Services
Administration Board of Contract Appeals (GSBCA or Board). The GSBCA
has judicial powers comparable to a court including a standard of review (de
novo) that allows direct challenges of the discretionary decisions of POs. Since
the Board was empowered to hear bid protests in 1984, via the Competition
in Contracting Act, a relatively small number of procurements have been
protested (approximately 200/yr.)3 but these account for as much as one-third
of the $17 billion that the federal government annually spends on
computational and telecommunication equipment.4
The model developed in Section I explains many of the observed phenomena
of the protest process when each of many potential protesters can obtain a
Board ruling to include all excluded firms (i.e., the remedy is a public good).
The model allows us to investigate certain policy interventions as well.
The salient procedural rules and remedies available at the Board as well as
the observed behavior of firms and procuring agencies within the protest
process are as follows. A protest of the bid solicitation (i.e., due to inappropriate
exclusion, biased evaluation methods, etc.) must be filed before the bid
submission deadline. Other potential bidders may, within four days after such
a filing, attach themselves to the protest as intervenors. An intervenor obtains
the benefits of the protest at a reduced cost (in terms of legal expense) relative
to the lead protester (in practice these costs are allocated in a ratio of
approximately 2:1). If two firms file protests simultaneously for similar reasons,
then their protests are consolidated and the two share equally in the expense
of pursuing the protest. The procuring agency may settle with the aggrieved
firms by either revising the bid solicitation or by paying the bidders to withdraw
their protests. If no mutually satisfactory resolution of the grievance is offered
by the procuring agency, then the aggrieved firms may seek a decision from
5
the judges at the Board. The judges can order a revision of the bid solicitation.
They can also alter or suspend the procurement authority of the agency.
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Furthermore, where the Board rules in favor of the protester it may order that
the protester be reimbursed for bid preparation and legal expenses from the
Permanent Indefinite Judgment Fund (PIJF). Finally, the Board sometimes
orders the procuring agency to reimburse the PIJF. It has been asserted that
the threat of protests in the face of these remedies has significantly deterred
POs from writing restrictive specifications.
In this paper we adopt a game theoretic framework to explain the observed
phenomena of the protest process and understand how it has curbed agency
behavior that is inconsistent with surplus maximization. The models have four
stages-(i) an inclusion decision by the PO; (ii) a decision to file a protest by

the firms; (iii) revision, settlement offers, or inaction by the PO; and (iv)
decisions by firms to accept a settlement offer or seek redress from the Board.
Our analysis is conducted in an environment of complete information with
two potential protesters where the Board's remedy is a public good. Two firms
who are excluded find themselves in a waiting game where each might forego
instigating a costly protest in hopes that their rival will protest and obtain
inclusion for both firms. The probability of neither firm protesting may be
sufficiently high to make exclusion and the risk of protest profitable for the
PO. Consequently, revision of the bid solicitation after a protest filing, a
commonly observed occurrence, emerges as an equilibrium phenomenon in
our model. It is important to note that our model is one of complete
information so that revision of a bid solicitation does not arise from
knowledgeable bidders providing information to a poorly informed PO.

Rather, revision arises from strategic behavior by a PO who is a bad agent
of taxpayers. In addition, if both firms have filed a protest we demonstrate
that a free-rider problem can arise in deciding whether to pursue a case to Board
decision. Each firm prefers that the other incurs hearing costs to obtain the
public good remedy. A PO can act strategically with two active firms prior
to this decision so as to reduce the probability of protest by either. However,
each firm will have a positive probability of protest implying that litigation
can arise in equilibrium without decision errors or information asymmetries.
We also find that government subsidization of successful protesters alleviates
the public good problem, while the intervention process makes it worse.
Important policy issues can be addressed using this model. First, we consider
a ban of cash settlements. (A less severe but similar proposal is contained in
House Resolution 3161 which is currently being considered by Congress.) The
fundamental motivation for such a proposal is that settlements often
circumvent the private attorney general function of protesters. Taxpayers are
not represented in the settlement negotiations between the protester and
procuring agency. We find that a cash settlement ban has a serious drawback.
It exacerbates the free-rider problem and thereby lowers the probability of filing
and protest. The lower litigation probabilities imply a diminished deterrent
effect of the protest process. Second, many of the participants in the protest
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process have recommended raising the costs of protests (penalizing losers more
severely, user fees, etc.). These proposed cost increases will also exacerbate the
free-rider problem-if the process is more costly to access then each firm will
prefer that another obtain the public good remedy. Third, as mentioned above,
current rules permit firms to join onto a protest as intervenors. Relative to
requiring all firms to file simultaneously and then share equally in protest costs,
intervention also worsens the free-rider problem. Specifically, every firm prefers
access to the public good at reduced cost, but without an initiator there will
be no opportunity for obtaining any relief.
We have written four other papers on the protest process. In contrast to
our current model, all of these papers study a single protester. Marshall, Meurer
and Richard (MMR, 1994a) explains many of the observed features of postaward protests via a game of incomplete information where a single potential
protester is uncertain as to whether a PO decision was the result of an agency
problem or, alternatively, some unobserved characteristic of the winning
bidder. MMR (1994b) demonstrates how protests and settlements impinge on
the initial bidding strategies to produce outcomes that are indistinguishable
from what would be accomplished with binding contracts between colluding
bidders. MMR (1992a) studies procurement mechanism design by a PO
suffering from an agency problem. Finally, MMR (1992b) studies pre-bid
protests in a model with decision errors by the Board. The contribution of
the current model is to study the impact of multiple potential protesters on
settlement and protest oversight.
The extensive literature on the settlement of litigation has been reviewed
recently by Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989). That research has identified private
information, inconsistent priors and asymmetric stakes as impediments to
settlement. The model in this paper follows a different path to generate
equilibrium litigation. The defendant (PO) may refuse to settle because of the
possibility that the free-rider problem keeps the protesters from taking their
case to a hearing. When the PO loses this gamble an equilibrium protest is
the result.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section I we analyze the pre-bid protest
game with two potential protesters in which a public good remedy generates
equilibrium protests. In Section II we address normative issues. Concluding
comments are offered in Section III.

I.

ANALYSIS OF SETTLEMENT WITH MULTIPLE
POTENTIAL PROTESTERS

In practice, the remedy granted following a successful protest may be either
a public or private good, or some hybrid. For example, relaxing a specification
limiting proposals to UNIX based operating systems might allow inclusion of
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both a protester and a non-protesting vendor who were both excluded because
they offered equipment with the same non-compliant operating system.
Alternatively, a protester that gains reversal of an exclusion based on their
allegedly deficient warranty or maintenance program is unlikely to benefit any
other excluded firm. We focus on the first type of exclusion with the public
good remedy.
In this Section we develop the model with intervention. In Section II we
will comment on the effect of eliminating intervention. Subsection I.A describes
the model, subsection I.B provides an overview of the equilibrium, and
subsection I.C provides a rigorous characterization of the equilibrium. The
reader may skip I.C on a first reading without losing the flow of our analysis.

A.

A Model With Two Potential Protesters

There are two potential protesters, designated as firms 1 and 2. The public
good problem is embedded in the model by supposing that the specifications
can only be written such that either firms 1 and 2 are both included or both
excluded. Under no circumstance can one of these firms be included while the
other is excluded. The payoff to taxpayers (the PO) when both firms are included

is T, (A,), while To (Ao) is the payoff to taxpayers (the PO) when both are
excluded. Inclusion of both firms is always preferred by the taxpayers (T =

T,-To > 0) and disliked by the agency (A = A,-Ao < 0). The net benefit per
firm from inclusion for firms 1 and 2 is V. The stages of the game are below.
Stage 1:

Stage 2:

The PO decides to include or exclude firms 1 and 2 from the
procurement. If firms 1 and 2 are included then the game is over,
otherwise we proceed to stage 2.
Firms 1 and 2 make a simultaneous decision to file a protest.
There is a non-negative cost incurred in doing so. If neither firm
files a protest then the game is over. If only one firm files a protest
we proceed to stage 2A. If both firms file a protest we proceed
to stage 3. If both firms file a protest they share equally in the
discovery costs. If only one firm files a protest and the other
firm attaches itself to the protest as an intervenor in stage 2A
then the original protester bears not less than half of the costs
of discovery. If only one firm files a protest and the other does
not intervene at stage 2A then the sole protester bears all

discovery costs.
Stage 2A:

The firm that did not file a protest can intervene in the protest
filed at stage 2. If they intervene they have the same legal status
as the lead protester but they bear not more than half of the
discovery costs. Whatever decision is made in stage 2A, we

proceed to stage 3.
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The PO can take two actions. She may decide to revise her
exclusion decision and include both firms I and 2. If revision
occurs the game is over. Alternatively, a non-negative cash

payment might be offered by the PO (to be paid by the procuring

Stage 4:

agency) to the protester(s) (or, protester and/or intervenor) in
exchange for withdrawal of their protest.
If there is only a single firm emerging from stages 2 and 2A and

revision does not occur in stage 3 then the firm decides whether
to accept the non-negative settlement offer or seek a decision

from the Board. If two firms emerge from stage 2 and 2A then
each separately decides whether to accept their individual nonnegative settlement offers or seek a decision from the Board.
If both firms seek a Board decision then they share the trial costs
equally regardless of whether one was originally an intervenor.
The Board will either leave the procurement unaltered or will
order inclusion of firms 1 and 2. The Board may also partially
reimburse the protester(s) for their protest costs.

.

To simplify notation and without loss of generality, whenever only one firm
files a protest at stage 2 we will label it firm 1. At stage 3 if both firms are
active, that is, both filed at stage 2 or one filed and the other intervened, then
the PO chooses a pair of settlement offers S, and S2
The allocation of legal costs between firms 1 and 2 depends on their status
as protester or intervenor. If a single firm participates in the protest hearing
at stage 4, then they pay 'p' regardless of whether they filed a protest at stage
2 or intervened at stage 2A. If two firms jointly participate in a hearing then
they each pay p/2 regardless of their status as a protester or intervenor. The
allocation of costs at stage 2 and 2A requires that if only one firm files and
the other firm does not intervene then the filer pays D. If intervention occurs
at stage 2A then the intervenor pays OD while the lead protester pays (1-O)D
where e[0,1 /2. If both firms simultaneously file at stage 2 then each pays

D/2.
The PO pays a pre-hearing cost of A whenever any firm files at stage 2.
If any firm prosecutes a protest at stage 4, then the PO pays 7r. These costs
do not increase when both firms are active. To assure that an excluded firm
acting alone has a credible protest threat we assume that the value of inclusion
for a firm exceeds stage 4 hearing costs plus stage 2 discovery costs.

Assumption 1. V > p

+ D.

If hearing costs for the PO were extremely high she would either revise or

buy-off firms in stage 3 so as not to incur

7r.

In addition, if stage 4 protest

costs for each firm were very low neither would be dissuaded from pursuing
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a protest at stage 4. Knowing this, the PO would never leave the firms the
option of pursuing a protest at stage 4. Consequently, assumption 2 is needed
to sustain the possibility of protests in equilibrium.

Assumption 2. p12 > >r
The specification of Assumption 2 is derived in the Appendix.

B.

An Intuitive Description of Equilibrium Behavior

In this section we provide an intuitive description of the parties' behavior
on the equilibrium path.
In the first stage of the game, the PO chooses whether to exclude firms 1
and 2. Even though the PO knows that an exclusion can be reversed through
a protest, she will still choose exclusion if the discovery costs to the agency,
0, are low, and the gains from exclusion, A, are high. Initial exclusion may
be optimal for the PO because the public good nature of the protest remedy
diminishes the deterrent power of protests, and because the possibility of
settlement may be an attractive option for the PO.
If the PO chooses exclusion at stage 1, then the firms choose whether to
file a protest at stage 2. In the environment of this model, specifications cannot
be written to distinguish (in a technologically meaningful way) between firm
1 and firm 2. As a result, the remedy provided by the Board to a successful
protester must necessarily be a public good. The firms face a free-rider problem
at the filing stage, and perhaps also later at the hearing stage. At the filing
stage each firm would like to avoid discovery costs, D, and at the same time
benefit from the revision of specifications obtained by the other firm.
Alternatively, each firm would prefer to be an intervenor and pay a smaller
share of the discovery costs, OD, than the firm who originally files a protest,

and who pays (1-0)D, where 0 > 1/2.
Although there are asymmetric pure strategy equilibria in which only one
firm files at stage 2, we analyze the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in
which each firm files a protest with probability y. (An expression for y is
provided in I.C.) By selecting the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium we
implicitly assume that the two firms are unable to coordinate their protest
activities to jointly provide this public good. Presumably, coordination
problems could be attributed to information asymmetries not modeled here.
The mixing at the filing stage (and also at the hearing stage) leads to underprovision of protest activity. From numerous discussions with administrative
law judges at the Board and lawyers active in protest law we see no evidence
of coordination of initial protest activities by firms, although coordination of
activities at the protest hearing and during settlement negotiation sometimes
does occur. We have also learned that pre-hearing costs tend to be twice as
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large as costs at the hearing, and intervenors pay roughly half of what lead
protesters pay.
The outcome of the mixed strategies at stage 2 is that both firms file with
a probability y2 , neither firm files with a probability (1-y) 2 , and otherwise, one
firm files and the other does not. The best outcome for the PO occurs when
no protests are filed, because then she succeeds in excluding the two firms. If
both of the firms file, then the game moves on to stage 3. If only one of the
firms files, then at stage 2A the other firm must decide whether to intervene.
In the next subsection we show that when the PO faces a single active protester
at stage 3, the PO either revises the specifications to include both firms, or makes
a settlement payment that induces the protester to drop the protest. At stage
2A, a potential intervenor looks ahead to the stage 3 outcome that would occur
if he chose not to intervene. If revision would occur, then the firm does not
intervene, because intervention is costly, and the potential intervenor would be
included regardless of its decision. Intervention only occurs when the potential
intervenor looks ahead and sees that the original protester will be bought off,
if it is the sole active protester. In this case, intervention assures the firm that
it will share in the fruits of the PO's stage 3 decision.
At stage 3, the PO's equilibrium behavior depends on whether there are one
or two active protesters (whether one of the two active protesters is an
intervenor is immaterial at stages 3 and 4). With two active protesters, the PO
may refuse to revise the solicitation, and refuse to buy-off the protesters. The
motivation for this tactic is that at stage 4, the two protesters once again face
a free-rider problem with regard to the undertaking of a protest hearing. The
PO may decide to take her chances that neither of the protesters will continue
the protest, rather than revise or settle.' If there is only one active protester,
then this tactic would never be used by the PO. The certainty of a stage 4 protest
makes revision at stage 3 more profitable to the PO than allowing a protest.
Of course, when the gains to exclusion are sufficiently large, the PO will not
revise, or risk a protest, and instead will make buy-off settlement(s) that are
certain to be accepted by the protester(s).
The fourth and final stage of the game is only reached if there are two active
protesters at stage 3, and the PO does not choose revision or buy-off. As was
true at stage 2, we choose the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium for this
subgame, rather than an asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium. Each firm has
an incentive to avoid participating in the protest hearing because of the cost.
In equilibrium, each firm participates in the hearing with probability z which
is derived below.

C.

Equilibrium Characterization

We characterize the equilibrium through a series of four lemmas culminating
in Proposition 1 at the end of this subsection. All proofs are contained in the
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appendix. We start with the end of the game and work backward. If stage
3 of the game is reached, there are two possible structures to the remaining
subgame depending on whether one or two firms is active. We will analyze
these subgames separately beginning with a single active firm.
Lemma 1:

Given Assumption 1, at stage 3 with one active firm the PO will
choose buy-off if Ao - (V - p) > A,, and revision otherwise.

In the subgame with one active firm (let it be firm 1), if stage 4 is reached,
firm 1 makes the profit maximizing choice between protest or settlement. Since
V > p by assumption 1, firm 1 always has a credible protest threat. It settles
if S, > V - p and protests otherwise. At stage 3 the PO would set S, = V
- p to gain a buy-off, or the PO could opt for protest or revision. Revision
dominates protest for the PO because they both always result in inclusion of
firms 1 and 2, but revision avoids the hearing cost 7r.
Next consider the case of two active firms at stage 3. Either firm would certainly

accept a settlement offer greater than or equal to V - p. If the PO offers nonnegative settlements of S, and S 2 that are less than V - p, then the payoffs to
the firms, contingent on their stage 4 actions, are represented in Table 1.
The symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium has protest probability for firm i of

zi(S;)=

('

-p-S;
V - p/2

where i = j.
At stage 3, the optimal choice for the PO may be revision, or buy-off with

S1 = S2 = V - p. The other possible equilibrium choice for the PO involves
a symmetric pair of settlement offers Si = S 2 = S*, where S* e [0, V-p). (The
fact that asymmetric settlement offers cannot be sustained in equilibrium is
demonstrated formally in the Appendix where an analytic expression for S*
can also be found.) For S* e [0, V-p) there is a positive probability of a protest
hearing. Consequently, we refer to this case as the protest outcome. We will
let the equilibrium probability of protest by one of the firms be given by
z = zi(S*) = z2(S*).

Table 1
Firm 2

protest
Firm

protest

settle

V-p/2, V-p/2

V-p, V+S 2

V+Sj, V-p

SI, S2

1
settle
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The optimal choice of S* by the PO at stage 3 may be a corner solution
with S* = V-p or S* = 0. In the former case, we note that z=0, and the protest
outcome is equivalent to the buy-off outcome, and hence is not discussed as
a separate case. The latter case of S*=0 will prevail as a distinct equilibrium
outcome for certain parameter values.
We can now define the payoffs to the PO at stage 3 (treating stage 2 discovery
costs as sunk).

Revision (RE):
Buy-off (BO):
Protest (PR):

U 3(RE) = A,
U 3(B0) =Ao

-

2"(V - p)

U3 (PRIS*=0) = (,-Z) 2 A, + (l-(l-Z) 2 ) (A,-7r
U3(PRIO<S*<V-p) = (1-z) 2.(Ao-2S*)
+ 2z(l-z)A-7.-S*) + Z2-(A,-7r)

It is important to note that z depends upon S*.
The protest payoffs are easily understood. In words, the expected payoff
to the PO when he offers S*=0 at stage 3 equals the probability that neither
firm protests times the payoff to having successfully excluded both firms plus
the probability that at least one firm protests at stage 4 times payoff to including
both firm net of protest costs. The expected payoff to the PO when 0<S*<Vp is the probability that both firms accept the settlement offer times the payoff
to having excluded both firms net of the two settlement payments plus the
probability that exactly one firm protests times the payoff to including both
firms net of protest costs and one settlement payment plus the probability that
both firms protest times the payoff to including both firms net of the protest
costs.
After defining
2

41r

2

'

1 -+p -- V
we are now able to state Lemma 2.
Lemma 2:

Given Assumption 1 and 2, at stage 3 with two active firms the

PO will choose buy-off if U 3(B0)>U 3(PRj0<S*<V-p). The PO
will choose revision if < 0 and U 3(RE)>U 3(PRI0<S*<V-p),
or, revision will be chosen if C > 0 and U 3(RE) U 3(PR IS*=0).
If none of the above cases apply then the PO will choose the
protest outcome.
Figures 1A and lB provide a helpful, graphical interpretation of Lemma 2
and Assumption 2. Although an intuitive motivation for is difficult, when 4
< 0 Figure 1 A is relevant and when 4 > 0 Figure lB is relevant. The figures
can be used to identify the optimal decision for the PO at stage 3 when there
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are two active firms. In each figure the payoff to the PO is graphed on the vertical
axis and A1 is graphed on the horizontal axis. Each figure contains three curvespayoff to the PO from buy-off, from protest, and from revision. The points a',
a2, a, and a4 which are defined in the Appendix represent values of A, where
the PO's optimal choice changes from one strategy to another. The slope of the

buy-off payoff curve is zero, it is unity for the revision payoff, and for protests
it lies between zero and one as demonstrated in the Appendix. Assumption 2
plays a big role in these figures-it assures that the protest payoff is higher than

the payoffs for buy-offs or revisions for some range of values of A'.
Why are there two figures? In Figure 1A values of AE[a', a 2) for which the
protest outcome is optimal always induce interior values of S* so that 0 < S*
< V2 -p. In Figure IB the optimal protest outcome induces an interior value of
S* for AiE[a', a') and for values of A, e [a', a4 ) induces S* = 0. In both figures
we show that buy-off is the optimal choice for A1 < a'. Revision is optimal for
A1 ? a2 when C < 0 as shown in Figure IA, and revision is optimal for A,
a4 and C > 0 as shown in Figure 1B.
In order to accomplish our analysis at stages 2 and 2A it is important to identify
which pair of strategies is optimal for the PO at stage 3 when either one or two
firms are active. We adopt the notational convention that lists the strategy chosen

with one firm active followed by the strategy chosen with two firms active-for
example, RE-PR means that with one active firm revision will occur, while with
two active firms protests will be the result. The only possibilities in our

U

0

Revision Payoff

Buyoff Payoff

Hearing Payoff

Af

0
Figure JA.

a1

a2

Payoffs to the PO with Two Active Firms at Stage 3 with C < 0
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U0
Revision Payoff
Buyoff Payoff

Hearing Payoff

1

a

A1

a3

a4

0
Figure 1B.

Payoffs to the PO with Two Active Firms at Stage 3 with

4> 0

model are RE-RE, RE-PR, BO-RE, BO-PR, and BO-BO. Why are there only
five when a total of nine are conceivable? First, there can never be protests
with a single active firm-the Board makes no errors and there are no
information asymmetries. This leaves only the absence of RE-BO to explain.
Intuitively, a PO who is willing to revise when faced by one active firm reveals
a preference for revision over buy-off. If this is the case then when two active
firms appear the PO will not prefer buy-off to revision since the only thing
that has changed is that buy-offs have become more expensive.
We now come to the question of whether a firm will intervene at stage
2A if given the opportunity. When A > -(V - p), the PO offers revision to
a single active firm and thereby effects inclusion of both firms. In this
circumstance the potential intervenor can avoid paying the discovery cost
OD and get its preferred outcome by not intervening. In contrast, when A
< -(V - p), intervention is profitable. Without it the PO will buy-off the sole
protester leaving the non-intervenor excluded and uncompensated. Thus at
stage 2A intervention is chosen only if failure to intervene would result in
the rival firm being bought-off. This leads to Lemma 3, which is closely
related to Lemma 1.
Given Assumption 1, if a firm has the opportunity to intervene

at stage 2A it will do so if Ao - (V-p) > A1

.

Lemma 3:
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Table 2
Firm 2
file

not file

file

q, q

r, s

not file

s, r

0,0

Firm I

The five different cases identified above (RE-RE, RE-PR, BO-RE, BO-PR,
and BO-BO) that can arise at stage 3, in conjunction with the intervention decision
at stage 2A, are crucial to determining the decision to file a protest at stage 2.
The potential protesters in this complete information game know the parameter
values that determine subsequent behavior in the later stages. We exhibit a generic
payoff matrix in Table 2 that can represent any of the cases.
In each of the five cases q, r, and s are positive and s > q. The value q is
the payoff to each of the parties when they both file, r is the payoff to the
filing party when the other does not file, and s is the payoff to the non-filer
when one party files. The realization of these payoffs for the different cases
is contained in Table 3. Each row of the table designates the pair of equilibrium
outcomes with one and two active bidders at stage 3. The column q is the ex
ante expected payoff to a firm when both file at stage 2. Similarly, r is earned
by a firm when it is the only one to file at stage 2, and s is earned by a firm
when its rival is the only one to file.
The derivation of the entries in this table is straightforward. In the column
q, the firm pays one-half of the discovery cost as one of two firms that files
at stage 2. In column r the firm pays the entire discovery cost in the RE-RE
and RE-PR rows because there is no intervention and (1- 0)D as the lead
protester in the other three rows. Recall that 0
1/2, this indicates that the
intervenor has a cost advantage. In column s the firm either avoids paying
discovery costs or pays the intervenor's share. The benefit to the firm in the
RE-RE and BO-RE rows is always V corresponding to revision. Revision also
leads to V in the RE-PR case when one of the firms files, if both firms file
then they get a lower payoff of zV from the mixed strategy protest outcome.
In the BO-PR row the firm always gets the payoff associated with the protest

equilibrium. As mentioned above, the equilibrium consists of an offer S* e
[0, V-p) which is accepted with probability z. The S* term is absent for the
RE-PR case because S* is always zero in that setting. Finally, in the BO-BO
row the firm gets the settlement payment of V - p.
We are interested in the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium of this game

in which the probability of filing for each firm is
y(A) =

r

r-q+s

(2)
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Table 3

RE-RE
RE-PR
BO-RE
BO-PR
BO-BO

q

r

s

V-D/2
zV-D/2
V-D/2
zV+S*-D/2
V-p-D/2

V-D
V-D
V-(I-e)D
zV+S*-(1-)D
V-p-(I-0)D

V
V
V-OD
zV+S*-OD
V-p-OD

(We are not interested in the asymmetric pure strategy equilibria of this game
because they represent coordination between the firms to eliminate the freerider problem. However, we do discuss this issue further in Section II.) This
leads to Lemma 4.
Lemma 4:

Given Assumptions I and 2, at stage 2 the symmetric Nash
equilibrium requires firms 1 and 2 to file a protest with

probability y(A)=r/(r-q+s).
From (2) we see that the probability of filing is generally less than 1. The
reluctance of the firms to file despite the certain validity of their protests is
explained by two factors. When A ? -(V - p) and a revision occurs given one

active firm at stage 3, a firm's payoff is highest when it does not file a protest
and its rival does. As a result the passive firm will be included but will incur
no costs to attain this status. Second, when A < -(V - p), both firms would
prefer to be an intervenor rather than a lead protester and incur lower costs

of filing. The greater the cost differential between a protester and intervenor
the more likely it is that no firm will protest at stage 2.
At stage 1 the PO chooses whether to include firms 1 and 2 and earn a
payoff of A1 or exclude the firms and earn a payoff that depends on
subsequent revision, buy-off or protest. The discovery cost A is crucial for
inducing the PO to choose inclusion at stage 1. If A = 0, then the PO will
always exclude knowing that revision is an option at stage 3 that will avoid
protest hearing costs and buy-off payments. When discovery costs are zero
the PO strictly prefers exclusion and revision to inclusion because of the
possibility that neither firm will file at stage 2. On the other hand, as A grows
large, the PO becomes reluctant to exclude firms 1 and 2 because of large
expected discovery costs. For a given A and 7r there is a critical value of
A, which we denote as Ac(A,7r), where the PO is indifferent between inclusion
and exclusion. If A < A. she prefers exclusion and if A > A, she prefers
inclusion. The latter case constitutes the phenomenon of deterrence that is
induced by the existence of the protest process. This leads us to the statement
of the main proposition for this model.
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The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the multiple
protester game is characterized in terms of A as follows. Given
Assumptions 1 and 2, firms I and 2 are included at stage 1

if A > Ac(A,7r) and excluded if A < A,(Ajr). The mixed
strategies played by the firms at stage 2 following initial
exclusion lead to a probability [l-y(A)1 2 that neither firm files
a protest in which case the game ends with both firms being
excluded. If the firms are excluded at stage 1 and only one
firm has filed a protest during stages 2 and 2A then the PO
will either buy-off the sole active protester or opt for revision.
If two active firms emerge from stages 2 and 2A then the PO
will choose either revision, buy-off, or protest. If the PO
revises with one active firm he will not engage in buy-off with
two active firms. However, all other combinations for one
active and two active firms are possible (RE-RE, RE-PR, BO-

RE, BO-PR, BO-BO).

II.

UNDERSTANDING THE FREE-RIDER PROBLEM

In this Section we explore the impact of protest costs, intervention and revision
on the free-rider problem.

A.

Costs

To improve our understanding of the effects of the public good problem
it is helpful to look at certain extreme cases. First consider the impact of letting
p approach 2 7r, that is, the hearing costs to the firm are as small as possible
under assumption 2.10 This eliminates equilibrium protests. The reason is that
the free-rider problem is abated as p falls. The benefits to a firm from shirking
at stage 4 are the avoidance of the hearing cost and the collection of the
settlement payment S*. From equation (1), one can see that the probability
of protest, z, moves inversely to protest cost for a fixed S*. It is natural that
a firm is more willing to conduct a protest hearing when the costs fall. One
must also account for the indirect effect on the probability of protest hearing
through the change in S*. In the Appendix we show that S* falls with p so
that the indirect return to shirking also shrinks. The ultimate effect (also found
in the appendix) is to dissuade the PO from risking the hearing cost ir, because
the probability of protest becomes too high."
Notice, however, that the free-rider problem at stage 2 persists, so that an
equilibrium involving revision is still possible. Free-riding at the filing stage
is attributable to the discovery cost, D. A reduction in discovery costs increases
the probability of filing, 2 but since this cost is sunk before the protest hearing,
it does not affect the probability of a hearing.
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In practice, the Board reimburses successful protesters for reasonable
discovery and hearing costs that are incurred (from the Permanent Indefinite
Judgment Fund at the Department of the Treasury). We find support for this
policy with regard to hearing costs since it results in avoidance of the freerider problem at stage 4. In addition, without protests in equilibrium there will
be enhanced incentives for the PO to revise bid solicitations. A drawback to
hearing cost reimbursement is that there will also be enhanced incentives to
engage in buy-offs. Our model is not directly applicable to the policy of
reimbursing discovery costs, because of two complications. First, discovery
costs are reimbursed given a revision, and second, the reimbursement of
discovery costs given a successful protest makes the cost of a hearing negative.
If we altered the model to account for these factors, we conjecture that the
free-rider problem would be eliminated at both stages. In equilibrium, the only
two possibilities would be both firms included at stage 1, or both firms bought-

off at stage 3.
B.

Intervention

We now consider the impact of intervention on the free-rider problem. We are
interested in two possible policy reforms. The first is a requirement that intervenors
share equally in discovery costs with the original protester. The second is the
complete elimination of intervention. The first policy can be analyzed in our model
by setting 0 = 1/2, which eliminates the cost advantage from intervention. The
second policy can be analyzed by eliminating stage 2A from the model.
To understand the effect of these policy interventions on the free-rider
problem, we first note that intervention does not occur in equilibria for
parameter values such that the PO would choose revision given one active firm
at stage 3. In these cases, the policy reforms which make intervention either
less attractive or impossible have no effect. In the alternative cases, in which
a single active protester will be bought off, intervention does occur with positive
probability in equilibrium, and the policy reforms do have an effect. If the
intervenor is forced to pay the same discovery costs as the original filer, then

the cost advantage of intervention disappears and each firm would find that
filing weakly dominates not filing. Similarly, if intervention is banned, then
filing strongly dominates not filing, because a non-filer gets nothing when the
original filer is bought-off. In both cases, the probability of filing, given that
a single filer would be bought-off, rises to one.
Despite the role of intervention in creating a free-rider problem at the filing
stage, there is a strong argument, outside of the context of our model,
suggesting that intervention might be socially beneficial. Firms might be
asymmetrically informed about the exclusionary nature of a bid solicitation.
One firm might be better able to foresee that a product evaluation test
effectively eliminates all but a few firms from competition. If this firm knows
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that no other firm would be able to see the exclusionary nature of the bid
solicitation then it must file a protest first. Intervention provides relatively
uninformed excluded firms the opportunity to join the protest and thereby
thwart buy-off settlements. On the other hand, intervention reduces the payoff

to acquiring information that can be used to foresee the restrictiveness of a
bid solicitation. This disincentive to becoming informed inhibits the private
attorney general role of protesters.

C.

A Ban of Cash Settlements

Congress has shown concern that buy-off settlements thwart the oversight
role of protests. In response, House Resolution 3161 would require that
settlements be approved by the GSBCA. We probe the implications of this
reform by supposing that cash settlements are banned." In terms of our model
this means that S, and S2 must equal zero at stage 3.
Although one might expect that a settlement ban would increase government
surplus, this is not necessarily true. Three relevant factors can be identified
within the model of Section I. First, from equation (1) it is clear that a cash
settlement ban would increase the equilibrium probability of a protest hearing
conditional upon stage 4 being reached. Elimination of the settlement offer
means that the gain to the free-rider is limited to protest cost savings, hence
each firm is more likely to prosecute the protest. This implies that the PO would
be more inclined to offer a revision at stage 3 under a settlement ban. This
is the anticipated positive effect of the settlement ban. Second, from equation

(2) and Table 3 it is clear that the equilibrium probability of filing falls. A major
motivation for filing a protest comes from the fear that if the other firm is
the sole filer they will be bought-off and leave the exclusion decision unchanged.
With this concern absent each firm has a diminished incentive to file. This is
a negative outcome. Perhaps the most stark way to see this is to realize that
no firm will ever intervene at stage 2A with a cash settlement ban since the
only possible action for the PO when facing a single protester is to revise the
bid solicitation. The third relevant factor is that a diminished probability of
filing induces the PO to exclude the two firms at stage 1 for more cases. Restated
in terms of the key parameter of Proposition 1, 4 increases. In other words,
the PO would risk incurring a large discovery cost at stage 2 by excluding both
firms since the probability of actually incurring the cost is small. Thus there
is a diminished deterrent effect resulting from the cash settlement ban.

III.

CONCLUSION

The model proposed in Section I explains equilibrium litigation as arising from
the court's public good remedy. Deterrence, revision of the bid solicitation,
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and buy-off settlements are also explained as equilibrium phenomena. The
current policy of intervention where firms can attach themselves to existing
protests at reduced expense was shown to exacerbate the free-rider problem
relative to a policy where firms are treated symmetrically. Since cash
settlements defeat the private attorney general function of a protester we
considered a ban of cash settlements. In this model with two protesters, such
a policy may aggravate the free-rider problem and diminish the deterrent effect
of protests. Finally, we show that reducing protest costs eases the free-rider
problem at the hearing and filing stages.
Standard empirical analysis of the findings in this paper would be difficult since
one of the most important observations would be the number of procurements
where a pre-bid protest should have been filed (from taxpayers' perspective) but
was not. Conversations with vendors indicate that this is indeed a common
phenomena. One mid-sized vendor informed us that they can often tell from
reading a bid solicitation if a procuring agency wants to buy from a specific vendor.
They typically do not protest such restrictive specifications since a successful protest
would only entitle them to compete as one of many included vendors.
Is the analysis in this paper applicable to other phenomena besides federal
procurement and protests? Any place where private attorneys general can be
found and the remedy offered by the court is a public good, are excellent
candidates. When a firm obtains a patent there might be numerous competitors
who would benefit from establishing invalidity. However, each firm prefers
that another instigate costly legal proceedings. Buy-off settlements will occur
if entry is restricted. When settlements occur taxpayers suffer since the
deadweight loss of monopoly production is left unaffected. Other potential
examples are seeking an injunction to stop a nuisance and antitrust litigation
to prevent a Section 2 violation.

APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. At stage 3 with one active firm the PO can offer S >
0 or revise to include both firms. An offer S < V-p is rejected with probability
one resulting in a payoff to the PO in the third period of U 3 = A,-S. Revision
yields U 3 = A', which dominates the preceding policy. Finally, an offer S>
V-p is certainly accepted. The optimal buy-off strategy is to set S = V-p, leading
to U3 = Ao-V+p. The statement of Lemma 1 follows from a comparison of
the revision and buy-off payoffs.
Proof of Lemma 2. As a preliminary matter we define additional notation
that will be useful in the proof. In the text we characterize the PO's behavior
in terms of A, or A. Here we will use instead the magnitude:

K =A

-

r.
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We characterize Stage 3 behavior by comparing K to the following values:

K, =

K 2 = e 2K 3 +

+ 2K 3,

2

/ 7r, K 3 = t - V2 , and K4 a -7r/S,

where C = p/2 and 6 = [{/k3 2. The values a", n = 1, 2, 3, or 4, that appear
in Figures lA and lB are defined as a" = Ao+7r+K". Notice that A1 > a" iff

K > K".
Recall that the PO could revise the solicitation and get a payoff of U 3(RE)
= A 1. Alternatively, the PO could offer the pair of settlement offers (Si, S2).
We now describe the reaction of the firms to these offers and the optimal choice

of offers by the PO.
-

To begin, notice that a firm will always accept a settlement offer Si ? V
p, so the PO would never set S, or S2 > V - p. When Si and S2 < V - p we
select the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium rather than the pure strategy
equilibria for reasons presented in the main text. The probability of protest, z;(Sj),
is given in (1) in the text. The expected payoff to the PO may be written as

U 3(S, S2 ) = Ao + (1-6)K - (1/K 3)2 [t(K-K 3)(S1 +S 2 ) + (K-2K 3)SS2]. (Al)
The PO chooses S, and S2 from [0, V-p] to maximize this expression. Let
S* = S, = S2 be the optimal symmetric settlement offer. Notice that K 3 <

0, so that for K

<

2K3, the PO sets S* = V - p. For K > 2K 3, (Al) may be

rewritten as

U 3(S, S 2) = Ao + (1-6)K - (1/K 3)2 (K-2K 3)[(S-S)(S 2-S) - $2],

(A2)

where

K-K 3
K-2K 3

(A3)

.

$=-

From assumption (1) we have 2K 3 < K1

< K 3. If 2K 3 < K < K1, then S >

V - p and the optimal choice for the PO is S* = V - p so buy-off results.
Equilibrium protest is possible for larger values of K.
If K, < K < K 3, then 0 < S < V - p. The PO makes the optimal settlement
offer S* = S to each of the firms. If K ? K 3, then S C 0, and the optimal
policy for the PO is S* = 0. Recall that we describe either of the equilibrium
outcomes as protest equilibria. When S* is greater than zero it is possible

that the PO will pay S* to one of the firms and defend a protest against
the other.

The payoff to the PO when S* E (0,V-p) is found from (A2) and it is
U 3(PRIO<S*<V-p) = Ao + (1-6)K + (K-2K 3)[S*/K 32 .

(A4)

And when the optimal settlement is zero the payoff is

U 3(PRIS*=0) = Ao + (l-6)K.

(A5)
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The payoff at stage 3 from revision is U 3(RE)= A, and the payoff from buyoff is U 3(BO) = Ao - 2(V-p). We must compare these payoffs to determine
when the PO will choose buy-off, protest or revision.
Assumption (2) is important here. If it is violated, then revision dominates
protest. Furthermore, it implies K 2 > K,. To order K 2 , K 3 and K 4 it is necessary
to consider two cases. The first is 4 > 0 b K 3 > K2 b K 3 > K4 . In this
case buy-offs are chosen by the PO for K 5 K,, protests with S* >0 are chosen
for K, < K < K 2 , and revision is chosen for K2 < K. In the other case when
( < 0, buy-offs are chosen in the same interval, revisions are chosen for K4
K, and protests are chosen otherwise. The settlement offer is positive when
K e (K,, K 3) and zero when K E [K 3, K 4).
Proof of Lemma 3.

The proof of Lemma 2 implicitly shows that when there

are two active firms at stage 3 the payoff to either of the firms is between zero
and V-p. If there is one active firm at stage 3, then the firm that is not active
gets a payoff of zero if the active firm is bought-off and V if the active firms

induces a revision. Therefore, a firm will only intervene at stage 2A if failure
to do so would result in a buy-off of the active firm. Hence Lemma I completes
the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4.

Obvious.

Proof of Proposition 1. Lemmas 1 and 2 characterize the play at stages 3
and 4. It is convenient to define Ks = K 3+C-7r and restate Lemma 1 in terms
of K and Ks. We have buy-offs with one active firm if K < Ks, and revision
otherwise. Similarly, Lemma 3 shows that intervention occurs if and only if
K < Ks. Under assumption (2), Ks > K 3, but the comparison of Ks and K4
is ambiguous. Using the results of Lemmas 1 and 2 we now enumerate all the
possible pairs of equilibrium strategies played by the PO at stage 3 when one

or two firms are active.
When C<0: K<K1 leads to BO-BO, K 1 K<K 2 leads to BO-PR with S*>0,
K 2 K<K5 leads to BO-RE and Ks K leads to RE-RE. When 0 and Ks>K4 :
K<K leads to BO-BO, K, K<K 3leads to BO-PR with S*>0, K 3 K<K 4 leads
to BO-PR with S*=0, K 4<K<K5 leads to BO-RE and Ks K leads to RERE. And finally, when ( 0 and Ks K4 : K<K leads to BO-BO, K 1 K<K 3
leads to BO-PR with S* 0, K 3 K<K5 leads to BO-PR with S*=0, K 5<K<K4
leads to RE-PR with S*=0, and K 4 K leads to RE-RE.
Since equilibrium behavior at stages 2 and 2A is fully described by Lemmas
3 and 4, we now come to the first stage of the game. The PO has the choice
between inclusion and a payoff of Ao or exclusion. In the latter case the payoff
depends on the number of active bidders at stage 3 and the PO's equilibrium
choice at that stage. Two observations are sufficient to assure that the various
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equilibrium outcomes displayed in Proposition 1 are all feasible. First if A =
0, then since A < 0, inclusion is dominated by revision. As argued above
revision is dominated at stage 3 by protest or buy-off for certain parameter
values, so any of these is possible in equilibrium. Second, for A > 0 and A
sufficiently close to zero inclusion is optimal. This second observation holds
because K > K 4 and Ks so that the equilibrium outcome at stage 3 would be
R-R. If the magnitude of A is less than A, then inclusion dominates revision
regardless of the firms behavior at stage 2.
The value of discovery cost A, which determines whether the PO will choose
exclusion or inclusion at stage 1 depends on K as well as on whether is positive
or negative and whether K 4 is greater or smaller than Ks. Recall that U 3

represented the PO's payoff at stage 3 and let U, represent the PO's payoff
at stage 1 from exclusion. We have

U,(BO-BO)
U,(BO-PR)
U,(BO-RE)
U,(RE-PR)
U,(RE-RE)

=
=
=
=
=

(1-y) 2 Ao +
(1-y) 2 Ao +
(1-y) 2Ao +
(1-y) 2 Ao +
(1-y) 2 Ao +

y(2-y)[U3(BO)-AI
y(2-y)[U3(PR)-A]
y(2-y)[U3(RE)-A1
2y(1-y)(U3(RE)-A1 + y2 [U 3(PR)-AI
y(2-y)[U3(RE)-A]

By setting the payoff from inclusion, A,, equal to U, in the various cases
we implicitly define Ac and thus find the critical values of A which determine
whether inclusion occurs at stage 1. Q.E.D.
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NOTES
1. A firm might also have grounds for a protest even though they can, and in fact do,
participate in a procurement. They may object to an evaluation method or specification that puts
them at an inappropriate (from a social perspective) disadvantage compared to their competitors.

Grievances are also frequently heard after selection of an awardee if losing firms believe that their
bids were evaluated in a manner that is inconsistent with the criteria as stated in the bid solicitation.
For a general discussion see Marshall, Meurer, and Richard (1991).
2. There are three common agency problems: shirking, unwarranted favoritism for a specific
vendor, and a bias for products that embody excessively high technologies.
3. GAO (1990).
4. Kelman (1990, 22).
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5.

For other recent work on non-monetary remedies see Shavell (1992).

6.

An unnamed counsel who represents protesters offered the statement below in a survey

conducted by the American Bar Association (1989, 73).
We have found agency personnel much more willing to consider agency protests seriously
since the GSBCA forum became available. Prior to the passage of [the Competition in
Contracting Act (CICA)], agencies had little, if any, incentive to provide meaningful redress
for vendor claims of illegal procurement actions. After the passage of CICA, agencies
gradually realized that their actions would be reviewed by a strong bid protest forum if
they failed to either correct problems on their own or provide meaningful denial of a
protester's claim.
7. Acceptance of a zero settlement offer should be interpreted as withdrawal from the protest.
8. This information was provided by Vincent LaBella, Vice Chairman of the GSBCA.
Information on these costs is available because successful protesters report their costs for
reimbursement.
9. In the following subsection we use the term buy-off settlement to denote the situation in

which the settlement offer is so large that one or both firms always accept the offer. In equilibria
in which protests are possible at stage 4, the PO may offer a zero settlement payment or a positive
settlement payment that is less than the "buy-off' settlement. Since a protest hearing is possible
in either case, we call both of the cases the protest outcome.
10. The comments in this paragraph apply with equal force when p = 0 in violation of
assumption (2). Recall that the purpose of that assumption was to assure the existence of
protests.

If.

It is important to note that the introduction of decision errors in the multiple protester

model can lead to the rebirth of the free-rider problem since the firms must be concerned about
positive expected protest costs.

12. In contrast to the free-rider problem at stage 4, setting discovery costs to zero does not
guarantee that the probability of filing will be one. There is one type of equilibrium outcome in
which discovery costs are not the only factor that discourages filing. For parameter values such
that equilibrium would result in revision given one active firm at stage 3, and protest given two

active firms at stage 3, then the firms face a coordination problem at the filing stage. If D=0,
then regardless of which strategy pair is chosen, they get the same payoff. And their payoffs are
highest if one files and the other does not. In a noncooperative setting, the symmetric mixed Nash
equilibrium leads to a positive probability of not filing for each firm.
13. The hearing cost p does affect the probability of filing. As p falls, the free-rider problem
at the filing stage is abated because the profit from buy-off or protest grows relative to discovery
cost.

14. We have studied the regulation and ban of settlements in Marshall, Meurer, and Richard
(1994a) in a context of a single post-award protester in a model in which the PO has better
information than the protester. The main finding is that eliminating buy-offs is desirable because
of the reduced cost to the government and increased deterrence. However, a settlement ban may
increase expected protest cost.
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